Establishing Regis Network Security Policy by Ortwein, Michael T.
Regis University
ePublications at Regis University
All Regis University Theses
Summer 2005
Establishing Regis Network Security Policy
Michael T. Ortwein
Regis University
Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.regis.edu/theses
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by ePublications at Regis University. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Regis
University Theses by an authorized administrator of ePublications at Regis University. For more information, please contact epublications@regis.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ortwein, Michael T., "Establishing Regis Network Security Policy" (2005). All Regis University Theses. 378.
https://epublications.regis.edu/theses/378
 
 
Regis University  
School for Professional Studies Graduate Programs  
Final Project/Thesis  
 
 
Disclaimer
 
 
 
Use of the materials available in the Regis University Thesis Collection 
(“Collection”) is limited and restricted to those users who agree to comply with 
the following terms of use. Regis University reserves the right to deny access to 
the Collection to any person who violates these terms of use or who seeks to or 
does alter, avoid or supersede the functional conditions, restrictions and 
limitations of the Collection.  
 
The site may be used only for lawful purposes. The user is solely responsible for 
knowing and adhering to any and all applicable laws, rules, and regulations 
relating or pertaining to use of the Collection.  
 
All content in this Collection is owned by and subject to the exclusive control of 
Regis University and the authors of the materials. It is available only for research 
purposes and may not be used in violation of copyright laws or for unlawful 
purposes. The materials may not be downloaded in whole or in part without 
permission of the copyright holder or as otherwise authorized in the “fair use” 
standards of the U.S. copyright laws and regulations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establishing Regis Network Security Policy 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Michael T. Ortwein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Project/Practicum Report submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Science in Computer Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
School for Professional Studies  
Regis University 
Denver, Colorado 
 
June 1st, 2005 
 
 
 
 
School for Professional Studies 
Regis University 
 i
 
 
 
 
An Abstract of a Project/Practicum Report Submitted to Regis University School for 
Professional Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master 
of Science in Computer Information Technology 
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This project proposes to establish a security policy for the computer lab Local Area 
Network (LAN) at the Colorado Springs Campus (CSC) for the Network Lab Practicum 
(NLP) by completing a network analysis to determine requirements.  Utilizing the current 
network configuration, a risk assessment will be performed to identify vulnerabilities and 
threats to the information system.  Once the risk analysis is completed, a network security 
plan will be developed to protect system resources.  The security policy will include, at a 
minimum, access policies, password management, firewall policy, policy on use of active 
code and the Internet, standards and interoperability policies, a VPN policy, and 
enforcement standards. The System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) approach will be 
used as the project methodology.  Key deliverables will include a configuration 
management baseline, security policy and procedures, wiring diagram, firewall, anti virus 
protection and lessons learned.  The project will culminate with a presentation to the 
academic board.  Class utilization of the LAN will determine the success of the project.  
In the final phase of the project, the LAN will be turned over to the CSC NLP for 
administration, classroom support and future project opportunities.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 Regis University’s Networking Lab Practicum (NLP) offers graduate students 
enrolled in the MSCIT program the opportunity to complete their professional projects by 
working to create functional LAN segments across the various Regis campus locations.  
In lieu of working individual, stand-alone professional projects, the NLP affords the 
chance to work as a team unit combining aspects of system design and systems 
implementation/engineering to move the LAN segment toward fully functional status.  
This has the benefit of providing the student with a “hands-on” practical experience to 
further the more “theoretical” learning acquired in the classroom. 
 The NLP team I worked with at the Colorado Springs campus focused on second-
generation improvements to the LAN.  The previous team had done the very basic 
legwork required to establish a functional LAN: cabling and connections; servers and 
client workstations; and OS installation.  Our job, then, was to move the LAN forward by 
implementing follow-on necessities: configuring MS Exchange; a backup and recovery 
system; a firewall; security policy; and configuration management policy.  Despite the 
fact that each of us worked full-time jobs of widely varying schedules, we worked well as 
a cohesive team in the lab atmosphere and were able to tackle a number of basic lab 
enhancements as a group before moving on to focus on the specific areas mentioned 
above.  Given my interest in computer network security, I gravitated toward the security 
policy development aspect of the LAN, and delved into what basic security elements 
would be required to bootstrap LAN security.  Chapter Four is a detailed description of 
that implementation; while security “ABCs” are covered herein, a security manager’s job 
is never complete, and I close with suggestions for future NLP security focus. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 Development of the Regis University Academic Research Network (ARN) 
requires the implementation of a Wide Area Network (WAN) linking Local Area 
Networks (LANs) at the various campus locations.  Previous Networking Lab Practicum 
(NLP) students had established a baseline configuration at the Colorado Springs campus 
(fig x) for further enhancement/development.  NLP leadership established specific goals 
for the 2003 NLP group: Microsoft Exchange Server, to implement an e-mail program; 
continued configuration management, to track the numerous changes to LAN software 
and hardware setup; firewall implementation, to help protect the network; establishment 
of a backup and recovery program, to ensure continued LAN operation during a 
contingency; and establishment of a baseline security policy for the lab.  Coming from 
the field of military intelligence and having particular interest in computer security, I 
gravitated toward the security policy topic.  As a Tier I student, my goal for the NLP was 
to not merely study and understand the LAN itself, but to develop, document, and 
implement a sound security policy, which future NLP students could refine as required.  
While the LAN at Colorado Springs exists only in lab form and is not yet utilized by 
students, staff and/or faculty as a “live” segment of the Regis WAN, making security a 
relatively low priority, its eventual transition to a fully employed WAN segment will 
make the security aspect a critical component of its overall competency/utility/capacity?  
Clearly, a thoroughly-developed security policy is a critical component of any 
organization’s networking hierarchy. 
 In order to proceed, I had to first understand the operating system’s built-in 
security mechanisms, and subsequently identify the baseline security configuration.  The 
Primary Domain Controller (PDC) for the Colorado Springs campus lab runs Microsoft 
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Windows 2000 for the nine client computers in the lab.  Based on Windows NT 
technology, Win2000 supports a solid network security program via the Active Directory 
(AD).  The first task, then, was to develop an understanding of how AD provides for 
domain security, and, secondly, how the AD domain profiles were currently configured.  
Not having seen any security-related topics developed by the previous Colorado Springs 
NLP students, I assumed very little, if any, work on AD security services had been 
accomplished. 
 In terms of project scope, my goal was to baseline the security program, 
implement a basic security policy for the current state of the LAN (per a risk assessment 
to identify threats and vulnerabilities), and document my work in order to provide future 
students the ability to enhance the security of the LAN as required.  One major barrier to 
project completion was a thorough lack of personal knowledge regarding the system 
administration side of security implementation for a specific Operating System 
environment (in this case, Windows 2000).  A second barrier proved to be the number of 
temporary duties involving travel I faced at work due to the concurrent stand-up of a new 
Combatant Command (United States Northern Command) in Colorado Springs.  Finally, 
a significant limitation for the project was the lack of an articulated vision for the future 
of the LAN in terms of programs, applications, data storage parameters – simply put, 
LAN utilization – that made a more thorough and forward-looking risk assessment 
impossible.  Instead of attempting to forecast such requirements, I utilized the 
information and LAN status available for the purposes of creating, or “bootstrapping,” a 
security policy from the ground level.  Clearly, “security” is an almost boundless topic 
where new threats emerge on a frequent basis.  This project is an attempt to take the 
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current configuration of the Colorado Springs lab and develop a baseline security strategy 
which future NLP students will be able to enhance as required.  The security policy will 
cover several areas: access policies; password and account management; firewall policy; 
policy on use of active code and the Internet; VPN policy; and enforcement standards. 
Definition of terms: 
AD: Active Directory.  Microsoft’s component for integrating directory services in a 
distributed computing architecture.  AD allows for central management and information 
sharing in a Windows environment.   
ARN: Regis University’s Academic Research Network.  A graduate student managed 
internetwork of campus computer information technology labs. 
Domain:  a collection of computers and other devices on a network that are administered 
as a cohesive unit using common procedures.  Windows 2000 Server supports domain 
architecture through the use of Active Directory.  The computer configured as a server 
and administering the domain is known as the primary domain controller (PDC). 
LAN: Local Area Network.  A network of computing devices spanning a relatively small 
physical area, such as a building or group of collocated buildings (campus). 
NLP: Network Lab Practicum.  A continuum of graduate-level work designed for 
students to enhance their CIT understanding while gaining hands-on experience through 
the development of the Regis University Academic Research Network (ARN). 
OS: Operating System.  The baseline software program running on a PC and/or server 
permitting the device to communicate with peripheral devices, organizing system data 
resources, and allowing other programs/applications to be run.  For purposes of this 
project, the OS is Windows 2000 (unless stated otherwise). 
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Risk Assessment: a study of network configuration vulnerabilities and threats to the 
information system.  By combining this with an understanding of the enterprise data to be 
protected, network security personnel can formulate plans to mitigate the dangers. 
SDLC: Systems Development Life Cycle.  SDLC is a framework for developing 
information systems via phases: analysis of requirements; design; implementation and 
testing; and administration/maintenance. 
VPN: Virtual Private Network.  A network established through the use of “tunneling” 
protocol(s) to securely link one’s enterprise system with that of a mobile user or business 
partner via public wiring. 
WAN: Wide Area Network.  A network made up of multiple connected LANs spanning a 
geographically larger area. 
 In summary, NLP leadership established the requirement for development of a 
security policy to enhance the lab’s progress toward a fully functional state.  The goal 
was to study the LAN’s current configuration and, utilizing the SDLC framework, 
produce a compatible security policy that could be further refined based on future 
additions/alterations to the LAN.   
 
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
 There is no shortage of literature and research source material available for the 
Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system.  Searches of bookstores and the Internet 
revealed dozens of titles and hundreds of hits, respectively.  Texts and documents 
discussing Win2000 security are only slightly less plentiful.  The major task proved to be 
culling the vast amount of information down to a useable level.   
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 No particular scientific research method was utilized.  Rather, my approach was 
to identify the problem (lack of an instituted security policy), gain an understanding of 
the present baseline network configuration, and simultaneously gather information on the 
network components that would impact resolution of the project (i.e., Active Directory 
and domain security tools).  Once this was accomplished, I reviewed available literature 
in an attempt to assist in development of a plan to baseline a security policy for an 
enterprise that, for all intents and purposes, had none in place. 
 As previously stated, tomes of text have been written discussing networking 
security.  Refining the material to that dealing specifically with the Windows 2000 OS 
was not especially difficult.  Finding research material suitable to the topic at hand was 
simpler at the beginning of the project, while I was focused on broad security overviews, 
but grew more challenging once I began to delve into specific sectors of the OS or 
security policy (i.e., mitigating the effects of active code by utilizing Internet Explorer’s 
security zone management tools).   
 Given that Windows 2000 has been fielded for years at this point, security policy 
surrounding the OS is well developed and security issues have been well documented.  
That said, there are always new developments in the field of network security; while 
security can never be “perfect,” it can almost always be better.  The sheer number of 
questions and answers in Microsoft’s online “knowledge base” dealing with security 
issues is testament to the battle being waged on a daily basis between malicious insiders 
and hackers on the one hand, and network security personnel on the other. 
 This project will make no groundbreaking contribution to the field of network 
security.  It is not intended to delve deeply into any one specific area of network security; 
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the intent is rather to apply acquired knowledge to the Colorado Springs lab in an effort 
to enhance the baseline security of that portion of the Regis University’s Academic 
Research Network.  If successful, the work incorporated herein could be applied to other 
segments of the Regis WAN running Windows 2000.  At the very least, I will highlight 
areas where one of the subsequent NLP teams may wish to refine or advance security 
should future network configuration make it prudent to do so. 
 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 In order to develop a product or refine a process in a non-haphazard fashion, some 
form of developmental framework is a necessity.  By utilizing a life cycle model, we can 
accomplish specific sets of tasks in an orderly and cohesive manner.  Information 
technology projects lend themselves well to a variety of models: more “linear” processes 
such as the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC), or similar “waterfall” which 
proscribe a set of phases designed to import analytical rigor to the process; or more non-
traditional design frameworks like RAD – rapid application development – or the 
iterative “spiral” methodology wherein the designers cycle through requirements, design, 
testing and application on a continual basis until the process is complete.  Given the task 
of developing a security policy, a more linear development process was clearly the 
answer.  The RAD framework is best suited to an organization requiring imminent 
application development, and lends itself to increased risk of error (especially with a less 
qualified (Tier I) project leader).  The iterative-type of systems design/implementation 
(spiral) is also less applicable to a step-by-step process, with clearly defined objectives, 
characterized by systems security design/implementation.  I therefore opted to utilize the 
SDLC framework.  SDLC describes the life cycle as beginning with a requirement of 
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some kind.  This is followed by a period of research and analysis intended to pinpoint the 
problem and develop possible theoretical solutions, which in turn leads naturally into the 
design phase, where a possible solution is crafted.  This solution is subsequently 
implemented and tested for applicability and results, and is maintained post-
implementation.  Documentation of all aspects of the project, from inception to post-
implementation, is a critical component of a thorough life cycle methodology, allowing 
for future systems designers to clearly understand each aspect of the process. 
 Development of a sound security policy is well-suited to the SDLC framework.  
The underlying requirement is simple enough: develop a policy to provide for a secure 
computing environment at the Colorado Springs ARN lab, while maintaining a balance 
between system protection and user connectivity and productivity.  Research and analysis 
will support and result in a risk assessment describing how and where the network is 
most vulnerable, which will provide the impetus for the design of an overall baseline 
security policy.  This policy will be implemented and subsequently tested, and following 
any alterations to the policy resulting from the testing, maintained (and possibly refined) 
by future NLP students. 
 Project deliverables will include this paper and its appendices describing an 
implemented security policy and a security policy drafted to support the Colorado 
Springs campus (and others as applicable) at Appendix E.  The Information Systems 
Security Policy (ISSP) is designed to support a “prevent, detect, respond” security policy 
and consists of a Security Policy (borrowed heavily from a University of North Texas 
policy) and an Acceptable Use policy (borrowed heavily from a University of Arizona 
policy).  These two policies make up the cornerstone of any educational institution’s 
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overarching security policy and have been adapted to fit the Regis University information 
technology environment.  Further adaptations may be required and the policies should 
certainly be vetted by the University’s legal and administrative staff prior to any 
implementation.  Chapter Four will spell out specific security-related details (accounts 
and auditing as well as Internet Explorer and port management) that underpin the more 
general security policy found at Appendix E. 
 
CHAPTER 4 PROJECT HISTORY  
 Bob Bowles piqued my initial interest in the overall Networking Lab Practicum 
when he raised the possibility during a class at Colorado Springs in 2002.  It seemed an 
ideal solution for an individual student in my situation, having received over two years of 
graduate CIT instruction but having little to no real “hands-on” time in a Lab.  I had 
learned much of the theory, but little of the practical application for the degree program I 
was pursuing.  Because of my particular employment situation, working with classified 
government systems as a user, developing a sound “real-world” project to use as my 
seminal project proved infeasible.  I therefore jumped at the opportunity to join in a team 
project that would both provide an enhanced level of expertise and yet require me to 
stretch my knowledge – and apply that knowledge – in a specific area of the Lab. 
 Management of the NLP was clearly established at the outset, and my 
understanding of the structure was enhanced by the first few monthly business meetings 
held at the Lowell campus.  Essentially, the Project Manager, Dan Likarish, established a 
set of priorities for implementation of the various phases of a Regis University WAN.  
Project Advisors (in our case Bob Bowles) then adapted these priorities for the specific 
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campus projects.  For Colorado Springs, those goals were articulated as second stage 
requirements following the standup of the initial LAN as completed by the previous CS 
NLP group.  Handed a working LAN, it would be our responsibility to develop basic 
administrative-type operational functionality as a logical “next step” in the NLP process.  
These particular requirements included establishment of a backup and recovery system, 
installation of Microsoft Exchange, implementation of a functional firewall, 
establishment of a sound methodology for configuration management, and development 
of a baseline security policy.  With a Tier II/III student to provide project guidance, 
individuals in the group selected a specific project and commenced their research and 
implementation.  The group concurred that weekly meetings at the Lab would prove 
beneficial to all members, both to work on issues affecting the group as a whole and to 
update each other as to individual project status.  Once these issues were completed at 
each weekly gathering, the Tier II/III student circulated among the Tier I students to 
check on their progress and assist them as required. 
 There were few significant milestones for this project.  Selection of the particular 
project subject and implementation of a baseline security policy are the major events that 
marked progression toward project completion.  As a Tier I student, the vast majority of 
project work involved researching sound security policy guidelines and attempting to 
ensure that all implementation was properly documented and thoroughly completed.   
 The following paragraphs summarize how group policy was implemented for 
security at the Colorado Springs Lab and the reasoning behind the decisions at which we 
arrived.  As previously stated, Windows 2000 employs Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to 
establish domain-wide configuration.  In establishing the domain security policy, security 
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is effectively implemented down to the PC level across the domain.  After researching the 
implications of the various issues surrounding policy implementation, I utilized domain 
policy settings to establish account policies for passwords, account lockouts, and 
Kerberos; a single policy for each is required at the domain level in Windows 2000. 
 Passwords are clearly critical to the authentication process in any given network.  
A user’s password allows the system to identify and authenticate the individual, 
permitting him or her to access system resources and carry out authorized tasks using 
those resources.  As such, the password represents a powerful, but dangerous, tool.  In 
many environments, such as the Colorado Springs campus, a password is the only thing 
other than user name required to access the system.  Weak password policy could permit 
unauthorized users to either guess or use widely available software tools to discover the 
password and thus gain access to the network.  Not only must the password be somewhat 
complex, but it should be changed periodically to enhance its safety from compromise.  
The enterprise security manager must consider several facets of password security policy. 
 The first of these is password history.  “Enforce Password History” establishes the 
number of unique new passwords a user must cycle through prior to reusing an old 
password.  The significance here is that frequent reuse of passwords opens up the 
possibility that users will adopt the same passwords repeatedly, opening them up to 
increased chances of compromise.  As with any policy, however, there are drawbacks to 
making things too difficult for the system user.  Setting the password history value 
(ranging from 0 to 24, where lower values allow users to reuse former passwords more 
frequently) at too high a number would force users to have to invent new passwords more 
frequently, thereby increasing the risk that they would simply write down their “secret” 
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password so as not to forget it (Microsoft Solutions 11).  For Regis, I determined that a 
reasonable password history should be set to a value of six: that is, a user could return to 
an old password after having established six new passwords in the intervening timeframe.  
Setting the value higher would only penalize the teaching staff and administrative 
personnel, while students would cycle through six passwords over a two-year period, 
approximately the lifetime of his or her enrollment at Regis. 
 The next password-associated policy, “Maximum Password Age,” establishes the 
duration (in days) that a single password can be utilized before being required to change 
it.  System settings range from a minimum of one to a maximum of 999 days; a zero day 
setting indicates the password will never expire.  This setting, like password history, is a 
crucial aspect of protecting user’s passwords: the more frequent the passwords change, 
the less risk that an adversary will be able to crack the password over time.  Again, the 
drawback is that a significant decrease in the amount of time that a user can employ a 
password correspondingly increases the chance that users will write their passwords 
down so as not to forget them – a major security lapse (Microsoft Solutions 12).  While 
most security-minded sources recommend a 30-60 day value be set, I believe that to be 
too restrictive in the current Regis environment and opted to implement a 120-day value.  
I would recommend, however, that future security managers revisit this setting; should 
more important data begin to be stored on lab system resources, it might be prudent to 
decrease this particular value.  At present, however, risk management and the lack of 
such vital data argue for a more relaxed setting. 
 The “Minimum Password Age” setting identifies, in a specified number of days, 
how long a password must be utilized before it can be changed by the user.  This function 
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is designed to thwart those users who would simply cycle through their required six 
passwords sequentially at a single sitting in order to reestablish their original or favorite 
password.  As already pointed out above, use of a single password is a breach of sound 
security practice and should be avoided.  Minimum Password Age can be set to values of 
zero (allowing immediate password reset) up to 998 days (Microsoft Solutions 12).  
(Note: a setting of zero would render the above “Enforce Password History” policy 
ineffective, as it would allow immediate reset.)  After researching the impacts of setting 
this value, I opted to establish the Regis NLP setting for this policy at 2 days.  While a 
low setting, this value should serve to discourage users from moving rapidly through 
passwords in order to return to a previously used password.   
 Another password-associated policy is “Minimum Password Length.”  This policy 
and the next (password complexity) are designed to enable security managers to require 
the enterprise’s user base to employ passwords of enough strength to avoid simple attacks 
designed to illegally break and obtain a password.  Minimum Password Length can set to 
values, of least characters required, between zero (where no password at all is required) 
to 14 characters.  The larger the number of characters required, the more difficult a 
password will be for brute force and dictionary-based attacks to obtain.  As is normally 
the case, however, there are negative impacts to establishing too high a value to this 
setting.  By requiring users to employ a password of lengthy characters, the chances are 
increased that they will need to write the password down, in turn, as above, equating to 
increased risk of individuals being able to gain access to unauthorized system resources.  
Another possible implication is simply that lengthy passwords are more easily mistyped, 
leading subsequently to more account lockouts (and therefore to increased help desk 
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workload!) (Microsoft Solutions 13).  Most security organizations recommend setting a 
value of eight characters for password length; again, this appeared to be perhaps slightly 
excessive for the current state of the LAN and I therefore established a setting of six 
characters.  When combined with the account policy immediately following this one, a 
minimum length of six characters should prove adequate to protect system resources. 
 “Passwords Must Meet Complexity Requirements” is the next password-
associated account policy to be considered.  As mentioned in passing in the above 
paragraph, many hackers employ dictionary- and/or brute force-type attack programs to 
attempt to break both user and system passwords.  Passwords made up of only alpha or 
alphanumeric characters are therefore more susceptible to these types of widely available 
attack methods.  By avoiding obvious words and simultaneously employing special 
characters, users can make their passwords exponentially more difficult to obtain.  In 
Windows 2000, this policy setting is either enabled or disabled.  If enabled, passwords 
are required to meet the following criteria: a password cannot contain any portion of the 
user account name; the password must be at least six characters in length; and the 
password must use characters from at least three categories (upper case; lower case; the 
digits 0 to 9; nonalphanumeric special character - %, $, etc.).  If enabled, these rules 
apply every time a user creates or changes a password (Microsoft Solutions 13).  While 
enabling this policy setting may have a slight impact to the user base, especially to those 
who are not familiar with typing special characters as a part of their passwords, the effect 
is minimal, especially in light of the significantly enhanced security posture.  Requiring 
password complexity is simply a wise addition to a sound security practice, and I 
therefore set this policy to “enabled.”   
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 The final password-associated policy setting involves encryption.  “Store 
Password Using Reversible Encryption” determines whether or not user passwords will 
be stored in the system in a form equivalent to plaintext.  If enabled, it effectively stores 
these passwords in a weaker format.  This policy is normally only enabled when using a 
particular portion of the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) (specifically, the Challenge 
Handshake Authentication Protocol, or CHAP) via remote access.  Unless applications 
require this specific protocol use, enabling this policy is not normally accomplished 
(Microsoft Solutions 14).  Windows 2000 domain security defaults to disabled; I opted to 
leave this setting at its default in order to maintain improved security for password 
storage. 
 The next set of security policies to be implemented in the Windows 2000 
environment at the domain level deal with account lockout.  Account lockout policies 
assist security managers by configuring the system to track and respond to possible 
attempts by unauthorized individuals to acquire a password through a trial and error 
process.  Depending upon how security managers set account policy values, Windows 
2000 Server will keep track of logon attempts and lock the account in question for a 
specified time frame before resetting the particular account. 
 “Account Lockout Threshold” is the first of these domain policies.  To avoid 
allowing unauthorized personnel an unlimited number of attempts to “guess” a user’s 
password, or, currently more dangerously, to break one using the heretofore mentioned 
automated programs, Windows 2000 Server can be programmed to lock a user’s account 
after a specified number of attempts has been reached.  Values for this policy, defined in 
number of logons attempted, run from zero (ensuring that no accounts are ever locked out 
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based solely on logon attempts) to 999 attempts.  As always, there are negative impacts to 
employing a lockout policy.  Should a hacker, for example, launch a simultaneous 
password attack against numerous enterprise users, he could quickly exceed the identified 
threshold of logon attempts, essentially creating a massive denial of service for those 
users as their accounts are locked.  An attack of this type will obviously impact any 
organization’s help desk.  On the other hand, setting the threshold for account lockout to 
zero would permit such a hacker to make an unlimited number of password attack 
attempts, which could go unnoticed by security managers until it is too late and the 
system is compromised (Microsoft Solutions 16).  Most organizations would not set this 
value to zero unless they also enforce extremely complex passwords and have a solid 
auditing policy in place.  Given the current state of the network at Regis University, 
establishing and enforcing such complexity is not desirable.  Setting the Account Lockout 
Threshold to a relatively low number in order to both prevent brute force attacks against 
user passwords and yet allow users to make a few mistakes when typing in their 
passwords thus seems prudent.  I implemented a value of five logon attempts before the 
system will lock the account. 
 The second account lockout policy describes the length of time that a locked 
account will remain unavailable to the user.  “Account Lockout Duration” can be set 
from zero (no account lockout will occur) to 99,999 minutes.  Setting the value for this 
domain policy too high will make the account more unavailable to potential hackers, but 
will likewise restrict the account’s use by authorized users, and may result in more calls 
from frustrated users to the help desk .  Setting the value very low could increase its 
availability to hackers, but has less impact on authorized users who have been locked out 
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by mistake (Microsoft Solutions 15).  For the Regis environment, a 30-minute lockout 
should prove sufficient to both deter hacking attempts to access an account while also 
limiting the impact to those users who have locked their accounts by accident. 
 The last of the three account lockout policies, “Reset Account Lockout Counter,” 
specifies what time must elapse after a failed attempt to log in before the counter is reset 
to zero.  The value range for this policy setting runs between 1 to 99,999 minutes; it is 
important to note that, if the security manager designates an Account Lockout Threshold, 
the Reset Account Lockout Counter must be equivalent to or less than the Account 
Lockout Duration.  Thus, having set the threshold at 5 attempts, the reset time would 
need to be set at 30 minutes or less (Microsoft Solutions 17).  In fact, I established the 
Reset Account Lockout Counter to 30 minutes in order to afford an acceptable modicum 
of security against brute force attacks against Regis user passwords.  For Regis, therefore, 
a user who makes five failed logon attempts within 30 minutes would be locked out of his 
or her account; the account would automatically be reset once 30 minutes had elapsed.  
An account administrator could, of course, reset the account manually before that time 
passed if necessary.   
 The last of the domain security policies involves the Kerberos authentication 
protocol.  Windows 2000 Server employs Kerberos (which is based upon both a 
password and private key encryption) as the tool for both authentication services and as 
authentication for a user to access and employ system resources.  In essence, Kerberos 
acts as a go-between for the user (logging on at a client PC) and the program managing 
the security for that resource (in our case, the Primary Domain Controller, PDC).  
Because it is not acceptable practice to transmit user names and passwords in clear text 
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across the network, Kerberos provides encryption for that communication (Bott 34).  For 
most organizations, the default settings for Kerberos are sufficient; I chose to leave the 
default values in place.  These values include a 10-hour maximum lifetime service ticket; 
a 10-hour maximum lifetime user ticket; a seven-day maximum lifetime for user ticket 
renewal; and a five-minute maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization. 
 Strengthening the logon and authentication process by utilizing the previous 
account group policy objects is a good start, but other significant security-related items 
remain to be dealt with.  “Prevent, detect, respond” are the watchwords for every 
enterprise security manager.  The policy implementations described above fall into the 
“prevent” category; a good security team will also strive to ensure that mechanisms are in 
place to notice any breach, should one occur, and alert security personnel so that a timely 
response is possible.  Fortunately, the Windows 2000 OS comes equipped with the means 
to audit certain system events, allowing security management to perform the required 
consequence management.  The subsequent paragraphs detail how this auditing has been 
implemented at the Colorado Springs campus lab. 
 Windows 2000 has the ability to monitor and track a wide range of security-
related events.  The challenge for the security manager is deciding, based upon risk 
management, exactly which types of events to audit.  A large organization with an array 
of irreplaceable data thought to be at some degree of risk is likely to employ many or 
even all of the operating system’s auditing capabilities.  Windows 2000 can audit account 
logon events; account management (when an account or security group is created or 
changed); directory service access (when a user attempts to access an AD object); object 
access (when a user attempts to access a file or folder set for auditing); policy changes; 
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privilege use (when a user exercises a set right); process tracking (program activation, 
indirect object access); and system events (Bott 681-682).  By default, all security 
auditing is disabled.  Clearly, indiscriminately attempting to track every instance within 
each of these categories is self-defeating.  Not only would the sheer volume of auditing 
activity hinder overall system performance, it would have the effect of having a probably 
already understaffed security management team looking for the proverbial needle in the 
haystack.    
Given the current state of the Colorado Springs LAN, many of these auditing 
categories are simply not required.  I opted to implement a minimum level of auditing, 
enabling monitoring for failed logon attempts, successful write access to program files, 
and successful instances of privileged use, policy changes, account management, and 
system events.  By tracking failed logon attempts, the log may empower security 
personnel to discover attempts by unauthorized personnel to access the network and 
system resources.  Auditing successful write access to program files (i.e., those with .exe, 
.com, and .dll extensions) may be indicative of virus activity within the network.  Finally, 
by monitoring successful privilege use, policy changes, account management, and system 
events, the security log may flag instances of misuse of administrative privileges.   
The remaining audit log question lies in how to configure the specific security log 
to compile and maintain the above data.  The OS provides for three solutions: (1) simply 
overwrite the older events once the log is full; (2) overwrite the log after a specified 
timeframe has elapsed (the default, set to seven days); or (3) not to overwrite any logged 
events.  The first and second options are the least manpower intensive, but could result in 
significant data being overwritten and lost.  The third option keeps all information in the 
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log, but requires some level of monitoring to ensure the log does not fill up (and 
subsequently effect system performance), at which point it must be manually cleared.  
This drawback can, however, be mitigated to some degree by simply limiting the overall 
size of the audit log itself (Windows NT Configuration Guidelines 11).  Again, in 
applying log maintenance to the current Regis system and corresponding low risk 
environment, I opted to employ the first option, whereby the log simply continues to 
compile information until full, at which point it overwrites older data.  I allowed the log 
name and file size to remain at their default settings 
(C:\\WINDOWS\System32\config\SecEvent.Evt and 512KB, respectively).  Only 
members of the Administrators group can view (and clear) the log, by utilizing Event 
Viewer, a Microsoft Management Console snap-in located in Computer Management 
under System Tools. 
As with many of the security settings outlined above, revisiting the array of 
auditing capabilities should be accomplished by future NLP security managers to ensure 
that LAN/WAN architectural and software alterations have not effected this initial 
approach to audit policy.   
Another major security-related arena in any network associated with the Internet 
or even accessible media is ensuring an effective antivirus program is installed and in 
place.  Early in the Practicum, our Tier III student emphasized the importance of ensuring 
the applicable antivirus software (in our case, Network Associates, Incorporated’s 
McAfee Virus Shield) was (first) running on our clients and (second) updated with the 
latest antivirus files.  Given its significance as a security-related item, I offered my 
services to ensure the program was available and current on our client base.  As a group 
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project during a weekly meeting at the Colorado Springs campus, we walked through the 
steps to locate the software and program the application to automatically retrieve the 
latest engine and associated antivirus (DAT) files.  Initially, we attempted to force the 
clients to point back to the Domain Controller server to find its most current antivirus 
files, but this effort failed when the clients did not seem to recognize the appropriate PDC 
files. 
 We then attempted to point the client-side program, via dial-up, to go directly to 
the NAI Internet site to retrieve updated files.  This appeared to work, and we 
programmed the update to occur on a weekly basis (every Sunday night at midnight) 
when it would not interfere with ongoing student or other Lab work.  In the following 
weeks, I checked each PC to ensure that the updates were occurring as scheduled (which 
in fact they did) and subsequently documented (utilizing step-by-step screen captures and 
accompanying text) how we programmed McAfee to acquire the updated information. 
 Some weeks later, I realized that we had failed to take the next step in ensuring a 
successful antivirus application, because we had not set up the McAfee program to scan 
the clients’ hard drives for virus-associated data.  Having become more familiar with the 
NAI software, I was able to step through the process required to establish an automatic 
weekly hard drive scan as well as put in place an autoscan of introduced media (floppy 
disks or CD-ROMs) and incoming e-mail and attachments.  Again, I documented the 
steps to accomplish this with screen captures of the appropriate windows accompanied by 
textual instructions. 
 Another area directly influencing the security status of any Internet-connected 
LAN is how securely the installed browser is configured.  A browser is, simply put, a tool 
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to display HTML-formatted information.  All too frequently, however, malicious code is 
resident on HTML web pages.  This presents the standard quandary for systems security 
personnel, pitting the functionality of Internet display and content against increasing risk.  
Internet Explorer (IE) is no exception to this rule, and risk management is a key concept 
in deciding just how to implement the security options resident in the program.  
Microsoft has included built-in security levels with IE that permit security managers to 
adopt, on a sliding scale, a level of acceptable risk.  By employing this functionality at 
the domain level, and then ensuring that users are unable to alter those settings, security 
personnel can mitigate much of the risk inherent in accessing and viewing web pages.  
Nevertheless, securing IE is an imperfect science at best, and opting for drastic security 
levels will almost certainly create significant consternation among the user community. 
 Active content includes ActiveX controls and plug-ins, Java applets, and scripts.  
While each of these is designed to improve the overall web application environment in 
terms of activity automation and ease of use, they may also contain either unintentional 
defects (that in some cases can lead to exploitation) or intentionally malicious code 
designed to allow unauthorized actions to occur on our system.  Security managers must 
therefore review how their network’s browser will access information on the Internet and 
how it can provide some mitigation for these dangers.  Internet Explorer deals with 
security concerns by establishing five different security zones and allows security 
managers and users to subsequently adopt a level of trust (essentially, acceptable risk) for 
each of those zones.  The zones are defined as Internet, Local Intranet, Trusted Sites, 
Restricted Sites, and My Computer.  (The My Computer zone, consisting of only those 
programs installed by the OS itself, is configured only through the IE Administration Kit, 
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and will not be covered further here.)  A sliding scale from low, medium-low, medium, 
high, and custom is available for each zone; these settings correspond to whether or not 
IE will enable, disable, or prompt the user for response whenever it comes across 
potentially dangerous material in that specific zone (Bott 267-269). 
 The Local Intranet zone consists of those connections identified through a 
Universal Naming Convention path along with sites designed to bypass the LAN’s proxy 
server (assuming they are not listed in either the Trusted Sits or Restricted Sites zones).  
These are sites lying behind the network firewall, topographically speaking.  IE security 
for this zone defaults to medium-low, which generally enables running and downloading 
most active content (How to Use Security Zones in Internet Explorer 1).  This makes 
sense, for the Intranet zone should reflect sites that are implicitly trusted more than those 
lying outside the enterprise’s intranet.  For the Colorado Springs LAN, I kept the default 
value in place. 
 The Trusted Sites zone can be considered even safer than the Local Intranet zone.  
Trusted Sites are those web sites, outside the firewall, in which the organization has 
established a high level of trust based upon mutual business dealings resulting in a high 
degree of confidence, or those Web sites on the organization’s intranet itself.  IE defaults 
to a low setting, enabling almost all active content except for unsigned ActiveX 
downloads (which prompts the user for a response) (Bott 267-269).  Again, this setting is 
presently satisfactory and I made no adjustments. 
 The Restricted Sites zone lists those Web sites that the enterprise does not trust to 
be safe.  By adding a site to this zone, the organization has decided that material on the 
site is likely to be harmful to the network.  For obvious reasons, IE defaults to a security 
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setting of high for this zone, disabling the downloading or running of almost all files 
containing active content, to include even Java permissions run on the virtual machine 
(How to Use Security Zones in Internet Explorer 1; Bott 267-269).  This setting also 
appears to be the prudent option for this category of potentially damaging content. 
The Internet zone can be considered a default zone, as it contains whatever web 
sites are not included among the other zones.  By definition, then, this setting will 
probably impact the user on a prevalent basis, as the vast majority of sites will fall within 
this category.  IE defaults to a medium setting, disabling the downloading and running of 
unsigned ActiveX controls, prompting the user for potentially unsafe displays, downloads 
and program execution while still enabling safe browsing using some ActiveX and Java 
applets (How to Use Security Zones in Internet Explorer 1; Bott 267-269).  The medium 
setting is currently acceptable and was left in place, but may require further study by 
future security managers as the LAN becomes more widely used. 
 In order to prevent local users from making changes to the implemented security 
policy settings above at the client level, I opted to change the Group Policy Object for IE 
at the domain level.  By enabling Disable the security page, I ensured that users would 
not see IE’s security tab on their local machine. 
 Tightening security on a network connected to the Internet invariably must also 
include a plan to disable any unnecessary protocols and services.  Leaving any unneeded 
ports open is tantamount to leaving the windows in a house open when the occupant 
knows there are burglars prowling in the neighborhood.  The following ports represent 
those with the potential for a hacker to gain possibly harmful data such as usernames, 
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computer names, and services used by those computers (Windows NT Configuration 
Guidelines 3-4). 
 
Function                      Static ports 
--------                      ------------ 
Browsing                      UDP:137,138 
DHCP Lease                    UDP:67,68 
DHCP Manager                  TCP:135 
Directory Replication        UDP:138 TCP:139 
DNS Administration            TCP:135 
DNS Resolution                UDP:53 
Event Viewer                  TCP:139 
File Sharing                  TCP:139 
Logon Sequence                UDP:137,138 TCP:139 
NetLogon                     UDP:138 
Pass Through Validation      UDP:137,138 TCP:139 
Performance Monitor           TCP:139 
PPTP                          TCP:1723 IP Protocol:47 (GRE) 
Printing                      UDP:137,138 TCP:139 
Registry Editor               TCP:139 
Server Manager                TCP:139 
Trusts                        UDP:137,138 TCP:139 
User Manager                  TCP:139 
WinNT Diagnostics             TCP:139 
WinNT Secure Channel         UDP:137,138 TCP:139 
WINS Replication              TCP:42 
WINS Manager                  TCP:135 
WINS Registration             TCP:137 
 
Obviously, blocking external connections to, specifically, TCP and UDP ports 135, 137, 
139 and UDP port 138 could prevent the hacker from acquiring potentially devastating 
information.   
 There are several methods available to security managers for restricting access to 
ports.  These include using TCP/IP filtering, a limited option that applies to incoming 
packets only (and not by IP address); using a software firewall (inherently weak, as a 
virus making its way to the computer itself could disable the firewall); using a hardware 
firewall; or utilizing IPSec filtering (much like TCP/IP filtering, but with the additional 
security of encryption and authentication).  IPSec filtering uses a model to note specific 
IP data, which is subsequently either blocked, allowed, or allowed after encrypting and/or 
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authenticating it.  IPSec filtering is a relatively sophisticated means of filtering access to 
ports, requiring development of an IPSec policy with filter rules and lists, enabling the 
policy, and then monitoring it and modifying it as needed (Bott 570-572).  For these 
reasons, the current Colorado Springs NLP policy will be to manage port access via the 
hardware firewall (Smoothwall).  For the immediate future, all ports will be blocked with 
the exception of those needed by the NLP to support FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, and possibly 
SMTP.  Other ports will be opened as justified to support additional protocols and IP 
services when needed. 
Services are another potential security nightmare.  Services are those programs, 
not requested by the user, that run in the background and work on requests from other 
active programs or the network.  Services are configured through the Services console.  
Windows offers numerous services; while many effect overall system performance, I will 
elaborate only upon those services most critical from a systems security standpoint.  
Cryptographic Services provide digital signature verification for signed files (device 
drivers and ActiveX controls, for example); this service should be left at the default 
setting of Automatic.  Event Log keeps the system’s Event Log operational and should 
never be disabled as the Log can be a critical tool for monitoring system security.  FTP 
Publishing is a part of Internet Information Services and represents a security risk.  
Disabling this service prevents any FTP server from starting in IIS (generating an error 
message about the service).  Remote Registry can permit remote workstations to alter the 
local Windows registry, and should therefore be disabled.  Remote management work can 
be valuable, but the potential vulnerability for remote abuse is significant.  Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is another IIS service (for e-mail transport) representing a 
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system vulnerability and ought to be disabled in the Services Console.  (In addition to 
being a security risk, SMTP can be hijacked by spammers when misconfigured.)  Finally, 
Telnet represents another command-line access threat to the system and should be 
disabled. 
 Like services and ports, disabling unnecessary accounts is a critical step in 
enhancing any organization’s security stance.  Every account represents a potential attack 
point for an attacker.  In addition to performing simple account management to ensure 
that accounts of former students, faculty and staff are deleted when no longer required, 
Windows 2000 security managers must be concerned with two specific accounts: 
Administrator and Guest.  Both accounts are inherent to Windows 2000 and both 
represent a danger simply due to the fact that hackers know that those specific accounts 
exist.  The good news is that there are simple ways to make these accounts less 
susceptible to attack.  The Guest account is a non-password required, limited access 
account designed to allow the occasional organizational guest or visitor to check e-mail 
or use a word processor, for example (Bott 85-86).  The best option available for the 
Guest account is simple: disable it.  This is the default account status, and I left it 
disabled. 
 The Administrator account is the more dangerous of the two, since administrators 
have root privileges and hence a significant level of control over domain resources.  
Microsoft (and other security proponents) therefore encourages security managers to take 
the following actions: first, rename the account to a “non-obvious” name (not, for 
example, “root” or “admin”); second, assign the account a very strong password (and 
change it frequently); third, establish a decoy Administrator account (without privileges) 
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and check the event log to see if there have been attempts to access the account; fourth, 
enable lockout of the actual account using the passprop utility; finally, disable the client 
PCs’ Administrator accounts.  By completing these actions, the security manager can not 
only decrease the Administrator account’s potential risk, but also increase the ability to 
take note of possible hacking attempts and take further action to defeat these efforts (Bott 
83-85).  Given the minimal risk to “crown jewel” type data presently located on the 
Colorado Springs LAN, I opted to take only the first step above and rename the 
Administrator account in an effort to shield it from prying eyes.  Future security 
personnel may wish to establish the decoy account, or “honey pot,” in an effort to provide 
advanced warning of possibly impending network reconnaissance and attack. 
 Finally, one frequently overlooked security aspect is that of physical security.  
Preoccupation with script kiddies and the myriad of technical issues often obfuscates the 
simple need to physically secure the network’s most precious resources.  This very basic 
threat requires absolutely no technical aptitude but can be as or more devastating than any 
Internet-borne code.  An open door to the server room can invite a malicious or 
disgruntled individual to physically damage the organization’s servers, carry one off, or 
allow him the access required to install network surveillance software, a Trojan horse 
program like Back Orifice, or one of any number of malicious programs.  In this case, all 
of the above technically-related solutions to lock down the system will have been for 
naught.  The Colorado Springs server closet is relatively secure: it remains locked when 
not in use and has no other means of physical access.  Keys are kept at the front desk and 
are only given out to personnel on the specified access roster provided to the staff by the 
NLP advisor.  A security guard makes the occasional rounds of the building, to include 
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the classroom area where the server closet is located.  Weaknesses include a relatively 
flimsy door with a single lock and the fact that the closet is located at a distance from the 
front desk where the guard spends most of his shift.  The closet is also located at the outer 
perimeter of the building, not an optimal location for the critical network resources in the 
event of more drastic natural disasters or very determined attackers, but suitable for the 
school’s present LAN equipment. 
 
CHAPTER 5 LESSONS LEARNED AND PROJECT EVOLUTION  
 The experience gained from working this project has proven invaluable.  While a 
student with more experience in the system administration realm might have 
accomplished this particular project in much less time, it has proven extremely beneficial 
for me to gain a thorough understanding of the major issues involved in securing a 
network.  The “hands-on” training, including everything from cable management to 
domain security policy application, has been a significant boost to my confidence level 
when dealing with IT issues.    
 In hindsight, there are some things that I might have approached differently.  For 
instance, I would have purchased the enormous tome (Bott) I utilized on securing the 
Windows 2000 environment earlier in the process and read it thoroughly prior to 
conducting the Internet searches I ran for basic security-related documentation.  The 
book’s well-organized information on a wealth of security issues would certainly have 
helped baseline my knowledge level and refine the searches I eventually used.  In 
actuality, by the time I found and purchased the book, I used it more as a reference guide 
in support of the material I had gleaned from the Internet. 
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 The project met most of my initial expectations.  I desired to supplement the 
classroom-based “theory” provided by the Regis MSCIT with the hands-on “practice” 
afforded by the NLP.  While I had additionally hoped to spend more of my NLP allotted 
time working even more technical issues (i.e., the firewall implementation or the MS 
Exchange load), a three-month business trip kept me from being able to spend the 
required time working with a major second area of the Colorado Springs LAN. 
 There is most definitely room for evolution of this particular project as the NLP 
process moves forward.  As I have repeatedly stated, the policy delineated above in this 
paper is a “mile long but an inch thick;” that is to say, it covers a very wide range of 
security topics but probably not to the kind of depth required for a fully functional, on-
line internetwork.  My recommendation would be for a future NLP student to take this 
security policy to the next level, especially as new applications and programs are added 
to the ARN that might require policy refinement or students find that some aspect of the 
security policy is too restrictive and inhibits productivity to an unacceptable level.   
 Specific areas of future concern may well have to do with some of the following 
issues.  As the LAN goes “live,” Microsoft IIS implementation and its corresponding 
security baggage will represent a major concern.  IIS, while offering potent services, is 
also notoriously full of potential security holes and must be very carefully administered.  
IIS is notorious for allowing semi-savvy hackers access to network resources.  Just as 
important will be eliminating any security seams between the LAN and the firewall.  
Continual review of what services are really required by instructors, students and 
administrators will be a challenge to the firewall administrator.  Clear communication 
between the network administrator(s) and security administrator(s) will prove critical and 
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will doubtless effect port management.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, I also 
believe that future security managers ought to review Internet Explorer security zone 
settings, review which events are audited and logged, and perhaps establish “honey pot” 
simulated Administrator or other accounts to draw in possible hackers as well as warn 
security personnel of potential attacks.  As discussed above, I recommend that one 
student in the following NLP groups register for Microsoft’s automatic e-mail 
distribution list in order to receive notification of updated security patches.  
Unfortunately, viruses, like bad news, travel fast in today’s computing environment, 
making rapid deployment of security-related patches critical to system reliability.  
Finally, to enhance the “detect” portion of the information systems security mantra 
“prevent, detect, respond,” implementation of some form of network intrusion detection 
system would be a prudent next step.  Given the resource-limited environment in which 
we are working, a public domain (free!) IDS along the lines of Shadow or Snort would be 
suitable applications to employ on the LAN. 
 At a more strategic level, I would recommend that Regis University faculty 
leadership strive to overcome the current extremely limited budget and resource backing 
for the NLP program.  It will be even more important for future NLP students 
implementing advanced LAN/WAN applications and programs to be able to rely on the 
latest technology – and most current hardware to run it – to move the network forward.  
Regis University should be a recognized leader in this field; a specific recommendation 
would be to dedicate an NLP student to the work of seeking out business partnerships up 
and down Colorado’s technology corridor that would fund and sustain modernization 
efforts for the NLP program.  It is unpleasant to be loading an application critical to the 
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success of one’s NLP work, and simultaneously be wondering whether or not the 
system’s limited disk space or memory will be able to handle the load or successfully run 
the program once installed.  NLP students ought to find themselves working “hands-on” 
with the technology they are likely to find as they begin to utilize their Regis degree in 
the workplace. 
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APPENDIX A 
DOMAIN SECURITY POLICY - DEFAULT 
START, settings, control panel, administrative tools 
 
 
 
Domain Security policy 
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Domain Security Policy - Menu 
 
 
 
 
Security Settings Menu 
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Account Policies: Password, Lockout, Kerberos 
 
 
 
Password Policies: enforce history, maximum age, minimum age, minimum length, complexity 
requirements, store using reversible encryption 
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Account Lockout Policy: lockout duration, threshold, reset counter 
 
 
 
Kerberos policy: enforce logon restrictions, max lifetime for service ticket, max lifetime for user 
ticket, max lifetime for user ticket renewed, max tolerance for computer clock synch 
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Local Policies: audit, user rights, security options 
 
 
 
Audit policies: account logon events  policy change 
  account management  privilege use 
  directory service access  process tracking 
  logon events   system events 
  object access 
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User rights assignment (none defined) 
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Security Options (all undefined or disabled) 
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Event Log - Settings for event log 
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System services (all undefined) 
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Public Key Policies: encrypted data recovery agents, automatic certificate request settings, 
trusted root certification authorities, enterprise trust 
 
 
IP security policies on Active Directory: client, secure server, server 
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APPENDIX B 
DOMAIN SECURITY POLICY - IMPLEMENTED 
 
 
Enforce Password History set to 6 passwords 
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Maximum Password Age set to 120 days 
 
 
Minimum Password Age set to 2 days 
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Minimum Password Length set to 6 characters 
 
 
Passwords Must Meet Complexity Requirements set to enabled 
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Store Passwords Using Reversible Encryption set to disabled (default) 
 
 
Account Lockout Threshold set to 5 attempts 
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Account Lockout Duration set to 30 minutes 
 
 
Reset Lockout Counter set to 30 minutes 
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Auditing Policies set as depicted 
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APPENDIX C 
ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE – AUTO UPDATE 
Anti-Virus 
Automatic Update Configuration Using FTP 
 
 
Note: You must have Administrative privileges on the computer to perform the following 
steps. 
 
1. Go to Start; Programs; Network Associates; VirusScan Console 
2. Dbl click on AutoUpdate  
 
 
3. Click Configure  
 
4.  Click Add 
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5. Enter the new site name: ftp 
Click Default to provide the path 
Click OK 
 
 
 
 
6. Highlight ‘Network Associates’ and click Move Down 
7. Highlight Network Associates and click Edit 
 51
 
 
 
 
 
8. Uncheck the Enable site box then click OK 
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9. Click OK on the VirusScan AutoUpdate window 
10.  On the Task Properties window, click the Schedule Tab 
 Check the Enable check box, then select the Weekly radio button 
 Enter 12:00 every Sunday, then click OK 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Close the VirusScan Console window 
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APPENDIX D 
ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE – AUTOSCAN 
AUTOSCAN Setup: downloads and media access  
 
Start then Programs then Network Associates then VirusScan Console 
 
 
 
 
Double-click VShield 
 
 
 54
 
From System Scan Status click Properties 
 
 
 
 
Under Detection tab, check Enable system scan 
Scan Inbound files and scan floppies on Access; deselect Outbound files and 
Shutdown 
 Scan All files including compressed files 
 General: uncheck system scan can be disabled; check Show icon in the Taskbar 
 Select Action tab 
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Under Action tab, select Prompt for user action from dropdown menu 
 In Possible Actions box, check all boxes 
 Select Alert tab 
 
 
 
Under Alert tab, uncheck Notify Alert Manager 
 In If ‘ Prompt for Action’ is selected, check all boxes 
 Select Report tab 
 
 56
Under Report tab, check both boxes in Log File box 
 Check Limit size of log file box; leave file path as default, limit size at 100Kb 
 In What to log box, check all boxes 
 Select Exclusion tab 
 
 
 
Under Exclusion tab, leave as default 
 Select Apply, OK 
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In System Scan Status window, select E-Mail Scan, Properties 
 
 
 
Under Detection Tab, select Enable scanning of e-mail attachments and Internet Mail; 
when Vshield notification window opens, click yes 
 Select Apply and OK 
If Vshield Configuration Manager window opens, select yes (to enable Download 
Scan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58
Select Download Scan; under Detection tab: 
 Check Enable Internet Download Scanning, All Files and Scan compressed files 
 
 
 
Select Action tab 
 Select Prompt for user action from pulldown menu 
 Check Delete file and Continue scan boxes 
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Select Alert tab 
 Check Display custom message and Sound audible alert boxes 
  
 
 
Select Report tab; Check Log to file box 
 Check Limit size of log file to box; leave file path as default, limit size at 100Kb 
 In What to log box, check all boxes; Select Apply and OK 
If Vshield Configuration Mgr window opens, select yes (enables Download Scan) 
 Close Download Scan Properties window 
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AUTOSCAN Setup 
 
From VirusScan Console, double-click Scan Drive ‘C’ 
 
 
 
From Program tab, select Normal Scan Mode from pulldown menu 
 Select Auto Exit radial button 
 Select Configure 
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In Detection tab, check Scan Memory, Scan Boot Sectors, and Start automatically boxes 
 Select All files radial button 
 
 
 
In Action tab, select Clean infected files automatically 
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Select Alert tab, uncheck all boxes 
 
 
 
Select Report tab, check Log to file box, leave file path as default 
 Check Limit size of log file to, select 100kb 
 In What to log, check all boxes 
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In Exclusion tab, leave all blank 
 
 
 
Select Security tab; leave all options without a password; leave box unchecked 
 Select Apply, OK 
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Back at Task Properties window, select Schedule tab; check Enable box 
 Select Daily radial button 
 Start at 00:00; check all day boxes except Sunday 
 Uncheck Enable randomization box 
 Select Apply and then OK 
 
 
 
Check VirusScan Console to ensure Scan Drive ‘C’ is now scheduled for next night at 
12:00 A.M. 
 
Exit VirusScan Console 
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APPENDIX E 
SECURITY POLICY – RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES 
* Note: Below Draft policies have not been coordinated with Regis University 
administrative or legal staff.  Before any attempt is made to implement these 
policies, such coordination should occur.  Highlighted text indicates an area where 
appropriate Regis titles/positions/offices should be incorporated. 
 
REGIS UNIVERSITY 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY POLICY 
 
1. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this policy is to:  
• ensure that the University complies with state laws and regulations regarding the 
use of and security of Information Resources  
• establish prudent and reasonable practices for the protection and security of 
Information Resources  
• educate employees, students, and others who may use Information Resources 
about the responsibilities associated with such use  
• protect automated information resources against accidental or unauthorized 
disclosure, contamination, modification or destruction, as well as to ensure the 
security, reliability, integrity and availability of information  
Regis University policy is to protect all data and information technology resources to the 
maximum extent possible in accordance with state and federal regulations.   
2. GENERAL GUIDELINES  
• Access to University information resources must be controlled. University owned 
information resources shall be used only for official academic purposes.  
• Confidential information must be protected from unauthorized access or 
modification.   
• Data essential to critical Regis University functions must be protected from loss, 
contamination, or destruction.  
• Risks to information resources must be managed. The expense of security 
safeguards must be appropriate to the value of the assets being protected, 
considering value to both the University and potential intruder.  
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• The integrity of data, its source, its destination, and processes applied to it are 
critical to its value. Changes to data must be made only in authorized and 
acceptable ways.  
• In the event a disaster or catastrophe disables information processing and related 
telecommunication functions, the ability to continue critical University services 
must be assured.  
• Security needs must be considered and addressed in all phases of development or 
acquisition of new information processing systems.  
• Security awareness of employees must be continually emphasized and reinforced 
at all levels of management. All individuals must be accountable for their actions 
relating to information resources.  
• The University information security program must be responsive and adaptable to 
changing vulnerabilities and technologies affecting information resources.  
• The University must ensure adequate separation of functions for tasks that are 
susceptible to fraudulent or other unauthorized activity.  
3.  RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INFORMATION RESOURCE SECURITY  
Various classes of persons have responsibilities for the security of data, software, 
hardware and other information resources at Regis University: 
• Information Security Officer - responsible for coordinating the University’s 
information security function. The Information Security Officer is charged with:  
o Recommending policies and establishing procedures and practices, in 
cooperation with owners and custodians, necessary to ensure the security 
of information assets against unauthorized or accidental modification, 
destruction or disclosure  
o Documenting and maintaining an up-to-date information security program  
o Monitoring the effectiveness of defined controls for critical information  
o Reporting, at least annually, to the President or his/her designated 
representative on the effectiveness of information resources security 
controls  
• Owner of an Information Resource - A person responsible for a business function 
and for determining controls and access to information resources supporting that 
business function. Owners are responsible and authorized to approve access and 
formally assign custody of an information asset, judge the asset’s value, specify 
data control requirements and convey them to users and custodians, and ensure 
compliance with applicable controls.  
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• Custodian of an Information Resource - The person responsible for implementing 
owner-defined controls and access to an information resource. Custodians also 
provide physical and procedural safeguards for information resources, assist 
owners in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of controls and monitoring, and 
implement monitoring techniques and procedures for detecting, reporting and 
investigating breaches in information security. Because custodians, by virtue of 
their system responsibilities, have access to information resources that are 
generally outside the scope of their positions, they also have additional ethical and 
procedural responsibilities, shown in the System Administrator Code of Ethics in 
section 4, below.  
• User of an Information Resource - An individual or automated application 
authorized to access an information resource in accordance with the owner-
defined controls and access rules. Users of information resources have the 
following responsibilities:  
        Individuals authorized to use University computing resources are 
prohibited from attempting to violate the security of other computer users 
on any system accessible via the University computer network. The 
violation or attempted violation of system security is grounds for 
revocation of computer access privileges, suspension or discharge of 
employees, suspension or expulsion of students, and prosecution under 
one or more of the following laws or policies: 
? Federal Copyright Law, Title 17, Section 117;  
? the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA)  
        Individuals are responsible for the security of any computer account 
issued to them and will be held accountable for any activity that takes 
place in their accounts. Any discovered violation or attempted violation of 
system security must be reported immediately to the Information Security 
Coordinator.  
        Each Regis University faculty and staff member (including student staff) 
who has access to the University's central computer systems or any 
terminal or workstation device connected to the University computer 
network is responsible for using only those resources and materials 
required to fulfill his or her job functions. Moreover, such use must be 
appropriate and consistent with those job functions and must not violate or 
compromise the privacy or security of any data and/or systems accessible 
via the University computer network. Users will formally acknowledge 
that they will comply with the University security policies and procedures.  
        Users must follow recommended security procedures for machines under 
their control, including but not limited to the use of virus scanning 
software and application of software and operating systems updates, and 
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will be held accountable for any activity that takes place on those 
machines.  
        Users are responsible for insuring that backup copies of essential data 
and software used on personal computers under their control are made 
frequently enough to prevent unacceptable loss of such data and software.  
        Each person having access to an administrative database is responsible 
for insuring the privacy and security of any information accessible to 
him/her in the normal course of his/her work.  
        Each person is responsible for the security of any terminal or workstation 
device accessible to him/her in the normal course of his/her work.  
4.  SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR CODE OF ETHICS  
Certain designated persons are given broader access to the resources of computer systems 
because their job responsibilities require such access. Typically, such persons are 
responsible for providing administrative services on the designated computer(s), services 
such as system maintenance, data management, and user support. The term "broader 
access" covers a range -- from wider access than given to an ordinary system user, up to 
and including complete access to all resources on the computer system. Persons with the 
broadest (complete) access are sometimes called "superusers.”   
This code of ethics applies to all persons given broader-than-normal access to any 
resources on Regis multi-user computer systems. It also applies to persons who authorize 
such access. The points contained in this code are considered additions to the 
responsibilities acknowledged by all ordinary computer users and by the authorizers of 
computer privileges.   
Responsibilities of Privileged Access Users  
Superusers (individuals with full access to files) and all other persons given broader-than-
normal access privileges on Regis University computer systems agree:   
• Not to "browse" through the computer information of system users while using 
the powers of privileged access unless such browsing: is a specific part of their 
job description (e.g., a corporate computer auditor); is required during file system 
repair, management, or restoration; is necessary to investigate suspicious or 
system-impairing behavior or possible violations of University policy; or is 
specifically requested by, or has the approval of, the person who authorized their 
privileged access. Browsing should never be accomplished unless it is in the best 
interest of Regis University.  
• Not to disclose, to any unauthorized person, computer information observed while 
operating with privileged access.  
 69
• Not to copy any computer information for any purpose other than those 
authorized under their defined job responsibilities or pursuant to an authorized 
investigation or review.  
• Not to intentionally or recklessly damage or destroy any Regis computing 
resources.  
• Not to accept favors or gifts from any user or other person potentially interested in 
gaining access to University computer systems.  
• Not to do any special favors for any user, member of management, friend, or any 
other person regarding access to Regis information systems. Such a favor would 
be anything that circumvents prevailing security protections or standards.  
• Not to tell or disclose to any unauthorized person the information required to gain 
privileged access, or to engage in careless practices that would reveal that 
information to unauthorized persons.  
• Not to attempt to gain or use privileged access outside of assigned responsibility 
(e.g., on other machines) or beyond the time when such access is no longer 
required in assigned job functions.  
• Not to change or develop any computer software in a way that would disclose 
computer information to persons not authorized to have it, or make it possible to 
to retain any special access privilege once that authorized privilege has been 
terminated by management.  
• Not to make arrangements on computer system(s) under their charge that will 
impair the security of other systems. In order to comply with this restriction, a 
system administrator setting up authorized networking connections should make 
use of available controls and protections as fully as reasonably possible.  
Furthermore, superusers and all other persons given broader-than-normal access 
privileges on Regis information systems agree that they will:   
• Report all suspicious requests, incidents, and situations regarding Regis 
information systems to an appropriate member of local campus system 
administration and/or information security management.  
• Use all available software protections to safeguard computer system(s) under their 
charge from unauthorized access by any person or another computer.  
• Take steps to the best of their ability to comply with all computer security 
standards and policies in force at Regis University and furthermore, to advise 
management and/or designated computer security representatives at Regis of 
deficiencies in these standards.  
• Conduct themselves in a manner that will foster security awareness and 
understanding among users.  
Responsibilities of Management   
Management should restrict the number of persons granted privileged access to a minimal 
practicable number. Management should tell the person who is responsible for overall 
administration of a system the names of all other persons who have been granted 
privileged access and what functions those persons have been assigned. Persons who are 
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to be given privileged access to a University computer system should be selected (or 
approved) by the Department Head owning or managing the operation of the computer 
system or by another member of management to whom this responsibility has been 
delegated.    
5. RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURES  
Risk analysis is the vehicle for systematically evaluating the vulnerabilities of an 
information system and its data to the threats facing it in its environment. It is an essential 
part of any security and risk management program. Although absolute security against all 
threats is unachievable, risk analysis provides a framework for weighing losses which 
may be expected to occur in the absence of an effective security control against the costs 
of implementing such a control. Risk management is intended to ensure that reasonable 
steps have been taken to prevent situations that can interfere with accomplishing the 
University mission. To that end, the following measures shall be taken:   
• An internal audit of the information security function shall be performed 
periodically, based on risk assessment, as directed by the President or the 
Associate Vice President for Computing and Communications Services acting on 
delegated authority for risk management decisions.  
• Owners of information resources shall periodically complete and/or commission a 
risk analysis of all information resources in their custody. The degree of risk 
acceptance (i.e. the exposure remaining after implementing appropriate protective 
measures, if any) must be identified and documented.  
• The Associate Vice President for Computing and Communications Services shall 
biennially complete and/or commission a risk analysis of information resources 
considered essential to the University's critical mission and functions. He or she 
shall also prepare or commission and maintain a written and cost-effective 
Disaster Recovery Plan that provides for the prompt and effective continuation of 
critical University missions in the event of a disaster. The Disaster Recovery Plan 
will be tested and updated periodically to assure that it is valid and remains 
current.  
6. PERSONNEL PRACTICES  
• People are the most important components of an information security program. 
People also represent the greatest threats to information security; therefore, 
maintaining employee awareness and motivation is an integral part of the security 
program. Managers are responsible for taking all measures necessary to insure 
that departmental staff maintain an appropriate level of confidentiality of 
information retrieved from University information sources. Examples of such 
information include personnel and payroll records, transcript and grade records, 
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financial aid information, and other sensitive data. Use of such information for 
unauthorized purposes is prohibited, as is access to such information in any form 
whatsoever by unauthorized individuals.  
• The University has developed and maintains an Acceptable Use Policy that details 
specific steps that should be taken to protect information resources at Regis. The 
use of University information resources implies that the user has knowledge of 
and agrees to comply with the procedures contained and referenced in the policy. 
Managers are responsible for insuring that all faculty, staff, and student members 
of their respective departments, including part-time or temporary employees, read 
and agree to the policies and procedures as outlined in this policy.  
• The IT Department shall provide literature and/or training to emphasize security 
awareness and the importance of individual responsibility with respect to 
information security. Supervisors must continually reinforce the value of security 
consciousness in all employees whose duties bring them into contact with 
confidential or sensitive information resources.  
• Supervisors are responsible for insuring that access privileges are revoked or 
modified as appropriate for any employee in their charge who is terminating, 
transferring, and/or changing duties. Supervisors should provide notification to 
the appropriate custodian of an information resource whenever an employee's 
access privileges should be revoked or changed as a result of the employee's 
change in status. The custodian of each information resource shall establish 
procedures to insure that all security privileges associated with an employee's job 
function are revoked once it is known that the employee has ceased employment 
with the University. The separating employee shall cease to have any further 
access to confidential and sensitive information via University information system 
resources.  
7. PHYSICAL SECURITY PROCEDURES  
Without physical control over the access to information resources, there can be no 
security from unauthorized use of those resources because malicious or inexperienced 
persons could obtain access to the operating system of servers and/or desktop machines  
and thereby view, copy, delete, or otherwise cause harm to the files on the system. 
Therefore, the following procedures are critical to protecting the University’s information 
resources:   
• All University information processing areas must be protected by physical 
controls appropriate for the size and complexity of the operations and the 
criticality or sensitivity of the systems operated at those locations.  
• Managers shall conduct reviews of physical security measures annually as well as 
whenever facilities or security procedures are significantly modified.  
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• Physical access to centrally administered computer facilities is restricted to 
individuals having prior authorization from the IT Department. Authorized 
visitors shall be supervised.  
• The responsibility for securing departmentally administered computer facilities 
and/or equipment from unauthorized physical access and/or improper use rests 
with the manager responsible for the facility and/or equipment.  
• Information resources shall be protected from environmental hazards. Designated 
employees shall be trained to monitor environmental control procedures and 
equipment and shall be trained in appropriate responses in case of emergencies or 
equipment problems. Emergency procedures shall be developed and regularly 
tested.  
• No terminal or workstation logged in to a current job session capable of accessing 
confidential or sensitive information shall be left unattended unless appropriate 
measures, such as password protected keyboard locking, have been taken to 
prevent unauthorized use. The owner of the logged-in account is responsible for 
any activity that occurs during a job session logged-in under that account.  
• Data and software essential to the continued operation of critical University 
functions will be backed up. The security controls over the backup resources will 
be as stringent as the protection required of the primary resources. Backup of data 
and software stored on centrally administered computer systems is the 
responsibility of the IT Department. Departments administering networks are 
responsible for establishing regular schedules for making backup copies of all 
mission-critical data and software resident on their networks and for ensuring that 
the backups are stored in a safe location.  
8. INFORMATION SAFEGUARDS  
• The IT Department will purchase and maintain virus protection software for use 
on all University-owned or operated computers.  
• Each University department shall, as part of its contingency plan, provide for an 
alternate means of accomplishing its program objectives in case the system or its 
communication network becomes unavailable. Alternative procedures shall be 
established that enable University personnel to continue critical day-to-day 
operations in spite of the loss of the communication network.  
• When confidential or sensitive information from another university or state 
agency is received by Regis in connection with the transaction of official 
business, Regis shall maintain the confidentiality or sensitivity of the information 
in accordance with the conditions imposed by the providing agency or university.  
 73
• Except for public users of systems where such access is authorized, or for 
situations where risk analysis demonstrates no need for individual accountability 
of users, each user of a multiple-user automated system shall be assigned a unique 
personal identifier or user identification. User identification shall be authenticated 
before the system may grant that user access to automated information.  
• Mission-critical University systems which use passwords for authentication shall 
conform to the federal standard on password usage contained in the Federal 
Information Processing Standard Publication 112 (FIPS PUB 112), which 
specifies minimum criteria and provides guidance for selecting additional 
password security criteria when appropriate.  
• Appropriate audit trails shall be maintained to provide accountability for changes 
to confidential or sensitive information, software and automated security or access 
rules.  
• Encryption techniques for storage and transmission of information shall be used 
based on documented agency security risk management decisions.  
• Test functions shall be kept either physically or logically separate from 
production functions. Copies of production data shall not be used for testing 
unless all personnel involved in testing are authorized access to the production 
data.  
• Appropriate information security and audit controls shall be incorporated into new 
systems. Each phase of systems acquisition shall incorporate corresponding 
development or assurances of security controls.  
• Public access systems must authenticate the identity of any individual retrieving, 
creating, and/or updating sensitive or confidential information about themselves.  
• Public access systems must have security procedures in place to protect the 
privacy and confidentiality of individuals who access those systems, in 
accordance with federal and state laws.  
• Any individual who connects a machine to a campus network is responsible for 
maintaining security on that system (including password security) and for 
performing appropriate security updates so as to prevent security breaches to the 
University network.  
• The custodian of an information resource must take steps where possible, such as 
using an encryption system, to ensure that passwords cannot be obtained by 
interception of data communications transmissions or access to a storage device.  
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• Network access to an application containing confidential or sensitive data, and 
data sharing between applications, shall be as authorized by the application 
custodians and shall require authentication of any user of the application.  
9. SECURITY BREACHES  
Breaches to information resource security controls shall be investigated promptly by the 
owner of the information system, assisted by the IT Department Security Coordinator if 
such assistance is requested. If criminal action is suspected, the owner or investigating 
agency must contact the University Police, who shall investigate and take appropriate 
legal action. Violations of policy shall be reported to a faculty or staff member’s 
supervisor or, if the violation is by a student, to the Center for Student Rights and 
Responsibilities.  
10. SANCTIONS  
• Machines on the campus data communications network will be 
disconnected if they are deemed by the IT Department Security 
Coordinator to be dangerous to the remainder of campus or to the 
Internet in general.       
• Penalties for violation of this policy range from loss of computer 
resource usage privileges to dismissal from the University, 
prosecution, and/or civil action. Each case will be determined 
separately on its merits. Referrals for legal action will be made through 
the Office of the Vice Chancellor and   General Counsel.  
• If the offender is a faculty member, the procedures to be followed are 
those specified in accordance with the Regis Faculty Discipline Policy. 
• If the offender is a staff member, the procedures to be followed are 
those specified in the Performance Counseling and Discipline 
Procedure  
• If the offender is a student, the procedures to be followed are those 
specified in the Code of Student Conduct. If the student in violation of 
this policy is also an employee of the University, sanctions may 
include termination of employment.  
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REGIS UNIVERSITY 
ACCEPTABLE USE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES 
I. Introduction 
Regis University provides a wide variety of computing and networking resources to qualified 
members of the university community.  Access to computers, computing systems and networks 
owned by Regis University is a privilege which imposes certain responsibilities and obligations 
and which is granted subject to university policies and codes, and local, state and federal laws.  
All users of these resources must comply with specific policies and guidelines governing their 
use, and act responsibly while using shared computing and network resources including wireless.  
The purpose of this policy is to promote the efficient, ethical and lawful use of Regis University’s 
computer and network resources.   
II. Scope 
This policy applies to all users of Regis University computing and network resources, whether 
initiated from a computer and/or network device located on or off campus. 
III. Policy Statement 
Individuals using computer resources belonging to Regis University must act in a responsible 
manner, in compliance with law and University policies, and with respect for the rights of others 
using a shared resource.  The right of free expression and academic inquiry is tempered by the 
rights of others to privacy, freedom from intimidation or harassment, protection of intellectual 
property, ownership of data, and security of information.  While Regis University's network 
administration desires to provide a reasonable level of privacy, management cannot guarantee the 
confidentiality of information stored on any network device belonging to Regis. For security and 
network maintenance purposes, authorized Regis system administrators may monitor system 
devices at any time.  Electronic information on University networks or equipment, including, but 
not limited to, electronic mail and personal information, is subject to examination by the 
University where:  
1. It is necessary to maintain or improve the functioning of University computing resources;  
2. There is a suspicion of misconduct under University policies, or suspicion of violation of 
Federal or State laws; or  
3. It is necessary to comply with or verify compliance with Federal or State law. 
IV. Acceptable Use Guidelines 
The specific usage guidelines that follow are not intended to be comprehensive, but rather to 
establish and clarify the intent of this policy.  Situations not enumerated here will inevitably arise, 
and they should be interpreted according to the spirit of this policy. 
 
Each person using Regis University’s computer and network resources should:  
 
1. Take no actions that violate the Codes of Conduct and Academic Integrity, Classified 
Staff Personnel Policy Manual, University Handbook for Appointed Personnel, or 
other applicable policy or law.  This is not a comprehensive list of applicable University 
policies. In the event of a conflict between policies, the more restrictive use policy shall 
govern.     
 
See the following related manuals/documents for more information: 
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Faculty and Staff Manuals:  
Student Code of Conduct:  
 
2. Use security measures to protect the integrity of information, data, and systems. Users 
shall protect their computer systems and accounts by using strong passwords and 
employing anti-virus software consistent with management directives.  Users are 
responsible for safeguarding their passwords, and for using them only as authorized.  Users 
are also responsible for ensuring removable media are virus-free prior to accessing such 
media in University information systems.  Examples of misuse include using a computer 
account and/or obtaining a password that you are not authorized to use, using the 
University network to gain unauthorized access to any computer system, attempting to alter 
established University security settings, and using a "sniffer" or other methods in an 
attempt to "crack" passwords.   
 
See the following related documents for more information: 
Regis University Electronic Privacy Statement:  
Regis University summary of FERPA:  
Guidelines for Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal Information at Regis University:  
 
3. Clearly and accurately identify one’s self in electronic communications. Do not forge 
or misrepresent one’s identity.  Concealing or masking the identity of electronic 
communications such as altering the source of an email message by making it appear as if 
the message was sent by someone else is a violation of this policy.   
 
See the following related polices for more information: 
Electronic Mail Policy:  
Official Student E-mail Policy: 
 
4. Use computer and network resources efficiently.  Computing resources are finite and 
must be shared.  Users may use the University’s computer and network resources for 
incidental personal purposes, provided that such use does not (A) unreasonably interfere 
with the use of computing and network resources by other users, or with the University’s 
operation of computing and network resources; (B) interfere with the user’s employment or 
other obligations to the University; or (C) violate this policy or other applicable policy or 
law.  Regis retains the right to set priorities on use of the system, and to limit recreational 
or personal uses when such uses could reasonably be expected to cause, directly or 
indirectly, strain on any computing facilities, or to interfere with research, instructional or 
administrative computing requirements, or to violate applicable policies or laws.  Examples 
of inappropriate use include sending unsolicited e-mails via listservs, newsgroups, or other 
means (SPAM), sending “chain letters” or engaging in pyramid schemes.  
 
5. Do not harass or intimidate or use computer and network resources for unlawful acts.  
The University, in general, cannot and does not wish to be the arbiter of content 
maintained, distributed or displayed by users of the University’s computing and network 
resources.  For example, the University, in general, cannot protect users from receiving e-
mail they may find offensive.  Using the University’s computer or network resources for 
illegal activities, however, is strictly prohibited.  Unlawful use of University computer and 
network resources can expose the individual user and the University to damages claims, or 
potential criminal liability.  Unlawful uses may include, but are not limited to: harassment 
and intimidation of individuals on the basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation or disability; obscenity; child pornography; threats; any illegal activity (forgery, 
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harassment, intimidation, willful misrepresentation, defamation or unauthorized copying of 
anything); theft; attempting unauthorized access to data; attempting to breach security 
measures on any electronic communications software or system; attempting to intercept 
electronic communication transmissions without proper authority; and violation of 
intellectual property or defamation laws.  Do not use computer systems to send, post, or 
display abusive, slanderous or defamatory messages, text, graphics, or images. By using the 
University’s computer and network services, each user accepts the responsibility to become 
informed about, and to comply with, all applicable laws and policies.  
 
6. The use of university computer resources and networks is for legitimate academic or 
administrative purpose. Incidental personal use is permissible to the extent that it does not 
violate other provisions of this policy, interfere with the performance of employee’s duties, 
or interfere with the education of students at Regis.  Use of your computer account or the 
network for commercial activities that are not approved by appropriate supervisory 
University personnel consistent with applicable policy, or for personal financial gain 
(except as permitted under applicable academic policies) is prohibited. Examples of 
prohibited uses include using your computer account for engaging in unauthorized 
consulting services, software development, advertising products/services, and/or other 
private commercial activity.  
 
7. Respect copyright and intellectual property rights. Users must adhere to the U.S. 
Copyright Act, and the terms and conditions of any and all software and database licensing 
agreements.   Any form of original expression fixed in a tangible medium is subject to 
copyright, even if there is no copyright notice.  Examples include music, movies, graphics, 
text, photographs, artwork and software, distributed in any media -- including online.  The 
use of a copyrighted work (such as copying, downloading, file sharing, distribution, public 
performance, etc.) requires either (A) the copyright owner’s permission, or (B) an 
exemption under the Copyright Act.  Adhere to the terms of software licenses and other 
contracts.  Persons loading software on any University computer must adhere to all 
licensing requirements for the software.  Except where allowed by University site licenses, 
copying software licensed for University use for personal use is a violation of this policy.  
The law also makes it unlawful to circumvent technological measures used by copyright 
owners to protect their works.   Copyright infringement exposes the user, and possibly the 
University, to heavy fines and potential criminal liability.  Therefore, without limitation of 
other possible sanctions, the University may refuse, suspend and/or terminate computer and 
network access, with respect to any user who violates the copyright law, or who uses the 
University’s computer or network resources contrary to the terms of the University’s 
software or database license agreements. 
 
See the following related document for more information: 
United States Copyright Office {http://www.loc.gov/copyright} 
 
8. Respect University property. Misuse of University property includes, but is not limited to, 
theft or damage of equipment or software, knowingly running or installing computer 
viruses or password cracking programs, attempting to circumvent installed data protection 
methods that are designed and constructed to provide secure data and information, or in any 
way attempting to interfere with the physical computer network/hardware, or attempting to 
degrade the performance or integrity of any campus network or computer system. 
 
9. Make only appropriate use of data to which you have access.  Authorized University 
personnel (e.g. system, network and database administrators, among others) may have 
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access to data beyond what is generally available. Privileged access to data may only be 
used in a way consistent with applicable laws, University policies, and accepted standards 
of professional conduct.  Those who have access to databases that include personal 
information shall respect individual privacy and confidentiality, consistent with applicable 
laws and University policies regarding the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information.  Users should be aware, however, that state laws and Regis University 
policies, guidelines and regulations may prevent the protection of certain aspects of 
individual privacy.  Both the nature of electronic communications, and the public character 
of the University’s business make certain uses less private than users may anticipate.  For 
example, in certain circumstances, the University may permit the inspection, monitoring or 
disclosure of e-mail, consistent with applicable laws and with the University’s Electronic 
Mail Policy.  
 
See the following related polices/documents for more information: 
Regis Electronic Privacy Statement:  
Electronic Mail Policy:  
Regis summary of FERPA:  
Guidelines for Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal Information at Regis University:  
 
10. Respect and adhere to other departmental/college/Internet Service Provider's 
acceptable use policies. When using a University computer system and/or network to 
connect to a non-Regis University system or network, adhere to the prevailing policies 
governing that system or network. This does not in any way release your obligation to 
abide by the established policies governing the use of Regis University computer systems 
and networks. 
V. Consequences of Misuse and/or Non-Compliance  
Users who misuse University computing and network resources or who fail to comply with the 
University’s written usage policies, regulations and guidelines are subject to one or more of the 
following consequences:  
 
? Temporary deactivation of computer/network access  
? Permanent deactivation of computer/network access 
? Disciplinary actions taken by the department or Dean of Students Office up to and 
including expulsion from school or termination of employment 
? Subpoena of data files 
? Legal prosecution under applicable Federal and State laws 
? Possible penalties under the law, including fines and imprisonment 
Violations, complaints and questions should be reported to the Regis University Security 
Incident Response Team (SIRT) by email (sirt@regis.edu) or call xxx-xxxx. 
I have read the above conditions of service.  
   
   
 
Signature  
   
 
Date  
   
 
Name (typed)  
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APPENDIX F 
JOURNAL LOG 
November 06, 2002: Colorado Springs (2.0 hours/2.0 total)
Introduction to the NLP with previous NLP team.  Received rundown on the ARN and 
how the NLP program works.  Monitored group’s progress in the CS Lab. 
 
November 13, 2002: Colorado Springs (1.75 hours/3.75 total) 
Monitored previous NLP team’s progress as they worked to load Windows 2000 Server 
and downloaded Service Pack 3.  Began to familiarize myself with the CS Lab network. 
 
November 20, 2002: Colorado Springs (1.75 hours/5.5 total)
Monitored previous NLP team’s progress as they attempted to load MS Outlook on 
PC#3.  Load was unsuccessful; received successful “ping” but PC did not recognize 
exchange.cs.Regis.local as expected.  Tier III leader determined the fault with Outlook 
and subsequently successfully e-mailed to the other lab PCs. 
 
December 14, 2002: Lowell (5 hours/10.5 total)
NLP introduction at the Regis Lowell Campus by Dan Likarish.  Dan explained the NLP 
concept to new NLP students and discussed program requirements, to include: project 
responsibility; basic skills; mandatory meetings; journaling; and Tier I-III descriptions.  
After a brief on the methodology of presenting the final project, Dan described how the 
various pieces of the ARN fit together architecturally.  He also briefed the waterfall/spiral 
methodologies for student focus.  This was followed by a discussion of current work at 
the various campuses: NOC and Lab admin; security monitoring; transport and 
communication; VM Ware; and Oracle development.  We followed up with campus 
representatives giving us a status update for the various NLP projects at each campus. 
 
January 07, 2003: Colorado Springs (1 hour/11.5 total)
Introductory meeting between previous and current NLP groups for information 
exchange and project status update.  Bob Bowles, project advisor, discussed project 
proposals and Lab availability for weekly meetings.  NLP students began to divide up the 
priority projects for the CS Lab.  Given my interest in security, I opted to tackle the Lab’s 
security policy and implementation. 
 
January 11, 2003: Lowell (6 hours/17.5 total)
Meeting commenced with monthly campus updates.  Dan Likarish then went over the 
“new” MSCN 696 and discussed the final paper (to include expected writing style and 
format) and project presentation.  Dan covered the significance of basic MSDOS 
understanding, faculty mentoring responsibilities, and the intent to support middleware 
and implement SAN solutions.  He also discussed the TrackIT application and how to 
employ it in support of system requirements.  We closed with some comments on moving 
toward an MSCIT portal that would support students, faculty, and staff alike. 
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January 16, 2003: Colorado Springs (4 hours/21.5 total)
Full NLP group gathered: Bob Bowles (Advisor); Sonny Cordova (Tier II/III); Tim 
Krueger; Paul Mackenzie; Jim Reid; Beverlie Ascher; and myself.  We discussed 
administrative matters (meeting time and project prioritization), then discussed ghosting 
and familiarized ourselves with basic Windows 2000 functionality.  We created our 
domain administrative accounts and finalized project assignments (mine will be security 
and hopefully backing Tim on the firewall implementation). 
 
January 23, 2003: Colorado Springs (3.5 hours/25.0 total)
Bob Bowles opened the weekly CS meeting with a discussion on project proposals.  We 
then walked through the Ghost Server setup and moved on to review how the BelArc 
Advisor tracks the CS Lab equipment listing.  Led by Sonny, we looked at the network 
connections.  Since the connection out showed us to be down, we powered up the servers 
and successfully pinged.  We moved on to do some basic cable management as the server 
closet wiring was in poor condition.  We hooked up the KVM switch to our three servers 
(PDC, Primary Domain Controller; Ghost; and MS Exchange), and subsequently installed 
the Smoothwall firewall. 
 
January 30, 2003: Colorado Springs (3 hours/28.0 total)
We worked on ensuring automatic update of the Macafee antivirus software DAT files on 
a weekly basis.  We first attempted to do so by pointing the clients to a shared folder that 
we created on the PDC, but this failed to function properly.  We then used the VirusScan 
console to attempt to have the clients utilize ftp to go out through the network to 
ftp.nai.com/virusdefs.4x for automatic updates.  This effort appeared to be successful, 
and we scheduled the weekly update to occur at 12:00 on Sundays. 
 
February 06, 2003: Colorado Springs (2 hours/30.0 total)
We attempted to work some ghosting, but were unable to log on to the ghost server due to 
an incorrect password.  Upon checking the antivirus automatic update, we discovered that 
it had indeed updated at 12:00 Sunday as programmed.  As we scanned the software load 
on the PDC, we discovered that, according to our notes, Advance Server had been loaded 
10/24/02; given a 120-day license, the software would be due to expire approximately 24 
February. 
 
February 09, 2003: Home (5 hours/35.0 total)
Reviewed previous project proposals for content and format.  Drafted an NLP Project 
Proposal covering network security to send to Bob Bowles. 
 
February 13, 2003: Colorado Springs (3 hours/38.0 total)
Accomplished screen captures for the NAI antivirus autoupdate and e-mailed it to all 
NLP members.  I checked each of the client machines, and again each had successfully 
updated DAT files as of Sunday.  Spent most of the evening researching Microsoft 
Windows 2000 security background documentation. 
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February 20, 2003: Colorado Springs (2.5 hours/40.5 total)
Again attempted to access the Ghost server, with no success.  Sonny will work with Bob 
to see why we are encountering password trouble.  A check of the software licensing and 
talks with Bob indicate that we are in no danger of software expiration at this time (given 
that we are working off of student licensing).  NAI antivirus check still good on all 
clients; Macafee is updating both DAT files and engine version.  Sonny assisted me in 
reviewing where domain security policy applications reside within MS Active Directory. 
 
February 27, 2003: Colorado Springs (2.75 hours/43.25 total)
Continued to review pertinent security policy doctrine.  Located and reviewed extremely 
helpful tutorial from Sans.org titled “How to Bootstrap Information Security in Your 
Organization.”  Very thorough yet basic white paper.  We logged on to the Smoothwall 
firewall and reviewed its default settings.  We attempted to log on remotely from the 
green (internal) side with no joy. 
 
March 08, 2003: Lowell (6 hours/49.25 total) 
Led off with campus overviews and discussed accessing SharePoint.  Outstanding guest 
lecture on “Thin Infrastructure” by Mr. Morten Roising of NCD and Mr. Mike Wright of 
Global Village.  Very clear and thoughtful look at the promise of thin client computing. 
 
March 25, 2003: Colorado Springs (3 hours/52.25 total) 
Checked local (workstation #3) security policy to see what was in place.  Spent the 
evening reviewing how Windows 2000 implements security policy via Active Directory 
(AD).  Researched and read up on how security policy is implemented at the hierarchical 
Organizational Unit (OU), Domain, Site, and Local levels.  AD employs an object-
oriented approach to simplify policy management, grouping shared resources, user 
accounts, and domains, applications, services, and security policies as objects to be 
applied to the network. 
 
April 01, 2003: Colorado Springs (7 hours/59.25 total) 
Reviewed the Sans “Bootstrap” white paper.  Began to outline requirements for a security 
policy (i.e., identification of what to protect, risk assessment, vulnerabilities, management 
“buy-in,” user appreciation/understanding, accountability).  Also reviewed several 
Microsoft “best practices” documents dealing with establishment of a sound security 
policy.  Conducted further research on Active Directory structure/policy. 
 
April 12, 2003: Lowell (6 hours/65.25 total)
Led off with campus updates.  For CS, we mentioned having to reload MS Exchange due 
to a corrupt OS, but that we needed the key.  Dan directed us to TrackIT.  We also raised 
the Smoothwall configuration issue and whether the proxy should be on the server or the 
firewall.  Jim Lupo mentioned that it came down to a disk space issue, and that the 
Denver Tech Center had initially used the proxy but found it difficult when any imaging 
was required.  We remain unable to push a good Ghost image to date; Dan remarked that 
we should come up to DTC to observe how an image push is accomplished.  Dan also 
covered how MSCN 696B/C work, and reiterated his earlier comments on the mechanics 
of the  presentation itself. 
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April 15, 2003: Colorado Springs (4 hours/69.25 total)
Continued review of security best practices.  Researched security account policies: 
passwords, lockout, and Kerberos.  Studied AD application of domain-level security 
policy and how that policy is implemented in Windows 2000 environment down to the 
local accounts.  Looked into local policies for the clients, but implementation of a 
security policy will be implemented at the domain level here at the CS Lab. 
 
April 22, 2003: Colorado Springs (2 hours/71.25 total)
Personal research.  Focused on CERT recommendations for implementing security policy 
in the Windows environment.  Found a helpful document in the “tech_tips” section of the 
CERT website that provides information on the changes Microsoft made in the move 
from Windows NT to Windows 2000.  Information deals mainly with the transition to 
Active Directory and the Distributed File System along with Kerberos and improved 
file/folder encryption.   
 
April 29, 2003: Colorado Springs (1.75 hours/73.0 total)
Continued to research MS security configuration and study CERT documentation for MS 
Win 2000 security policy.  Called up current Domain Policy settings on Domain 
Controller; as I assumed, all settings were to default Windows 2000 “factory settings,” 
indicating that I’ll be starting with a clean slate.  I have now drafted a set of security 
policy criteria for the domain settings; will review with Sonny prior to implementation to 
ensure I’m not making changes that will cause difficulties for those accessing the 
network. 
 
May 06, 2003: Colorado Springs (3.25 hours/76.25 total) 
Implementation!  Began by sitting down with Sonny and logging on to the PDC.  I 
stepped through the various domain security settings and made my recommended 
adjustments to the defaults.  Specifically, implemented password (history/age/minimum 
age/minimum length/complexity/reversible encryption), account (lockout 
duration/threshold/reset account), and Kerberos settings.  Must have done my homework 
– Sonny concurred with all recommendations.  A small step for him, but a giant leap for 
me! 
 
May 10, 2003: Lowell (6 hours/82.25 total)
Monthly business meeting in Denver.  Commenced with standard campus updates, 
followed by a good network reconnaissance brief by Jeff.  Jeff covered nmap utility (for 
looking at the network’s open ports, and what we should be seeing from both TCP as 
well as UDP port activity.  Interesting discussion on running open ports from behind the 
firewall and ensuring they are blocked to outside traffic.  Dan then covered the nGen 
Vlab Enterprise Architecture and access to the server farm to allow students to practice 
bringing up services, loading, and administering to the network.  Dan also briefed the 
progress in SAN technology, stressing the fact that SAN is a network to itself, with 
intelligence built-in.  He mentioned IPSAN and its limitations and applications.  Network 
Area Storage (NAS) and SAN combination provide a good way of looking at both active 
storage and archival storage of data. 
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May 15, 2003: Colorado Springs (3 hours/85.25 total)
Had to change my password at logon….which is good, because it means my password 
setting changes have taken effect.  While researching other security issues, I realized that, 
while we have implemented automatic update of the Macafee antivirus DATs and engine, 
we have not yet set the clients to run an autoscan.  Sure enough, autoscan data is not 
enabled.  I consider this to be an important element of an overall security policy, so I will 
take this item for action and provide the other NLP students with a set of screen captures 
allowing them to easily complete an autoscan setting for their client PC. 
 
June 12, 2003: Colorado Springs (3 hours/88.25 total)
Back from leave….where was I?  Ah, yes – autoscan setup.  Worked the screen captures 
to walk through the setup; given low turnout tonight, I will try to accomplish as many of 
the PC updates as possible on my own.  Ended up batting .500 – completed workstations 
3, 5,6, and 7.  Paul was using 2 all evening; on 4 I received a “config32.exe” error; 8 
shows no NAI application even loaded to the machine; and 9 appears not to be connected 
to the CS domain.  Will revisit these four workstations next week. 
 
June 14, 2003: Lowell (5 hours/93.25 total)
Campus updates as lead item.  Discussed pending 696B registration and my pending 
three-month absence (TDY to Norfolk) with Dan.  Dan advises me to register for CS 
696B course, but not attend, and he will deal with issue later.  Mentions not to worry 
about the “F” I’ll receive, and that he will take care of it.  We spent most of the morning 
looking at the network architecture with an emphasis on firewall implementation and use 
of encryption.  Variety of implementations: the DTC is going with a packet filter; 
Broomfield with a Shorewall, and CS and Fort Collins with Smoothwall firewalls.  Phase 
One of the implementation incorporates a VPN between the DTC, Broomfield, and the 
Adult Learning Center; Phase Two will extend the VPN to CS and Fort Collins.  Dan and 
Jim covered the implementation of wireless APs at the ALC.  Some good news: CS will 
apparently receive some new PCs in the near future that will be a modest upgrade from 
those we now employ at the Lab! 
 
June 19, 2003: Colorado Springs (2 hours/95.25 total) 
First item of the day was to check the status of the weekly antivirus scan to ensure it was 
successful on the four PCs I completed earlier.  Check of the VirusScan console showed 
scans of the hard drives had occurred as scheduled.   Still no joy with the remaining PCs; 
Sonny’s recommendation is to not bother with the final four, given that we will soon be 
replacing the PCs altogether and will therefore need to reconfigure the autoscan anyway.  
Spent some time reviewing security registry settings. 
 
June 26, 2003: Colorado Springs (2 hours/97.25 total)
Checked the autoscan again; antivirus autoupdate and autoscans both running smoothly 
on configured machines.  I noted a couple of screen capture errors I had made in the 
autoscan process and corrected them to ensure new PCs would be properly configured 
when the time comes.   
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July 18, 2003: Norfolk, VA (5 hours/102.25 total)
Research: Internet Explorer Security Zone settings   
 
July 19, 2003: Norfolk, VA (5 hours/107.25 total)
Research: Domain Policy and Security Settings   
 
July 27, 2003: Norfolk, VA (3.25 hours/110.5 total)
Research: Windows 2000 Server baseline security 
 
August 03, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4.5 hours/115.0 total)
Research: Internet Explorer and active script issues 
 
August 10, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4.0 hours/119.0 total)
Research: Administrator and Guest Account issues 
 
August 16, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4 hours/123.0 total)
Paper organization, Outline   
 
August 17, 2003: Norfolk, VA (3 hours/126.0 total)
DRAFT – Title, Front Matter   
 
August 23, 2003: Norfolk, VA (3.25 hours/129.25 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 1  
 
August 24, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4.5 hours/133.75 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 2 
 
August 30, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4.0 hours/137.75 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 3 
 
August 31, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4.25 hours/142.0 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 4 
 
September 06, 2003: Norfolk, VA (5.0 hours/147.0 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 4 
 
September 07, 2003: Norfolk, VA (3.5 hours/150.5 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 4 
 
September 20, 2003: Norfolk, VA (5.0 hours/155.5 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 5 
 
September 21, 2003: Norfolk, VA (4.25 hours/159.75 total)
DRAFT – Journal Log 
 
September 27, 2003: Norfolk, VA (3.5 hours/163.25 total)
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DRAFT – Journal Log 
 
September 28, 2003: Norfolk, VA (5 hours/168.25 total)
DRAFT – Appendices (screen captures) 
 
October 04, 2003: Colorado Springs (4.5 hours/172.75 total)
DRAFT – Chapter 4 
 
October 12, 2003: Colorado Springs (3.75 hours/176.5 total)
Review of MLA Handbook: writing style, citing references 
 
October 18, 2003: Colorado Springs (4.0 hours/180.5 total)
DRAFT – Works Cited (bibliography) 
 
October 26, 2003: Colorado Springs (4.0 hours/184.5 total)
EDIT – Chapters 1 and 2 
 
November 02, 2003: Colorado Springs (3.75 hours/188.25 total)
EDIT – Chapters 3 and 5 
 
November 09, 2003: Colorado Springs (5.25 hours/193.5 total)
EDIT – Chapter 4 
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